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Abstract
A rule-based system of World Trade Organization (WTO) should be supported by effective mechanism of 
disputes that ensure the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) rulings toward the respondent could be enforced. 
The WTO DSM aims to provide predictability and security in international trade by providing strict time-
frames, and was designed to be mutually agreed by the disputing members, flexible and binding. For the 
developing countries in the WTO, they need major effort in terms of training and institutional reform to 
meet the challenges of participation in the WTO DSM. Indonesia has involved in the WTO DSM.
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Intisari
Sistem perdagangan WTO harus didukung oleh mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa yang efektif. Kepatuhan 
pada putusan Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) sangat penting agar manfaat perdagangan dapat dirasakan 
oleh seluruh anggota WTO, termasuk negara-negara berkembang. Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) WTO memberikan keamanan dan prediktabilitas atas proses sengketa di WTO yang dibutuhkan 
oleh seluruh anggota WTO sehingga memberikan kesempatan luas bagi negara-negara anggota WTO 
untuk berpartisipasi dalam mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa di WTO, termasuk Indonesia.
Kata Kunci: WTO, DSU, mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa. 
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A. Introduction
International trade has grown dramatically 
in the past 60 (sixty) years due to the world’s 
nations have cooperated in eliminating protectionist 
domestic legislation and in promoting free exchange 
of goods.1 Global trade flows are dominated by 
exchanges within and between the three major 
regions of the global economy (the so-called triad): 
Europe, North America, and East Asia. Intra-EU and 
intra-North America trade accounts for 52 percent 
of industrial trade.2 On the contrary, developing 
countries share of world exports of goods accounted 
29,8 percent.3 Indonesia share in world total export 
only 0,97 percent, and share in world total import 
only 0,99 percent.4 Regardless of the different 
percentage on share of total world trade, the central 
challenge that the world faces today is to ensure that 
globalization becomes a positive force for all the 
world’s people. In fact, many developing countries 
and countries with economies in transition face 
special difficulties in responding to this central 
challenge. Nevertheless, the most remarkable 
trend of international trade law during the past six 
decades has been the steady movement away from 
tariffs and quota towards free trade among states. 
In the globalization era, every state is 
encouraged to keep their economic pace with 
the economic development. As Kofi Annan said, 
“the benefits of globalization are obvious, [...] 
faster growth, higher living standards, and new 
opportunities, not only for individuals, but also 
for better understanding between nations, and for 
common action”.5 In other words, globalization 
era opens new challenges for developing countries 
to prosperous their region regardless inequality 
of distribution of welfare in the world. However, 
as stated by Kofi Annan in international trading 
system, “instead of open markets, there are too many 
barriers that stunt, stifle and starve. Instead of fair 
competition, there are subsidies by rich countries 
that tilt the playing field against the poor [...],”.6 
Therefore in term of size and contribution to world 
trading, there is inequality among WTO member 
countries. In order to make the trading system more 
secure and predictable, the international community 
needs a reliable and comprehensive mechanism to 
solve trade disputes that arise from the international 
trade.7 The number of complaints brought to the 
WTO DSM has increasing substantially for the last 
decade which currently in total of 452 cases. This 
number indicates that the WTO DSM be regarded 
as the prevalent channel of peaceful settlement of 
trade dispute compare to other international tribunal 
boasting a much longer history of existence.8
Moreover, WTO dispute settlement mecha-
nism (WTO DSM) is regarded as a multilateral 
system of settling disputes that replaced unilateral 
mean that has been utilized by WTO member 
countries especially developed countries before 
the establishment of WTO.  WTO DSM does 
accommodate each nation an equal say in the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) regardless of their 
size even though it has dominated by developed 
countries.
1 WTO, “Understanding the WTO”, www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/tif_e.htm, accessed on 19th February 2015.
2 B. Hoekman and M. Kostecki, 2001, The Political Economy of the World Trading System, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 9.
3 WTO, “International Trade and Market Access Data”, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm, accessed on 19th February 2015.
4 WTO, “Country Profile: Indonesia”, http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView. aspx?Language=E&Country=ID, accessed on 
19th February 2015.
5 United Nations General Assembly, UN Millennium Declaration, Resolution adopted on 8 September 2000, paragraph11.
6 WTO, “Message of the UN Secretary-General”,  http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_ e/min03_e/statements_e/12.pdf, accessed on 
19th February 2015
7 In the WTO context, typically, a dispute arises when a country adopts a trade policy measure or takes some action that another member considers 
to be a violation of a WTO Agreement. A dispute may also arise if a member feels that, as a result of another country’s action, it has been 
denied WTO benefits to which it is entitled, see WTO, “Dispute Settlement in Commercial Diplomacy”, http://www.commercialdiplomacy.
org/manuals/wto_dispute.htm, accessed on 21th February 2015.
8 For example the ICJ (established in 1945) has 152 cases, the GATT (established 1948 – 1994) is 300 cases, the ITLOS (established in 1994) 
20 cases, and the NAFTA (established in 1992) 3 cases.
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Table 1. Top 10 Users of WTO DSU9
No. Member As Com­plainant
As Res­
pondent
As Third 
Party
1. USA 113 98 97
2. EU 85 70 125
3. Canada 33 17 83
4. Brazil 26 14 73
5. Mexico 21 14 67
6. India 19 20 80
7. Argentina 15 17 44
8. Korea 15 14 69
9. Japan 14 15 129
10. Thailand 13 3 1
Some say that this mechanism can erode sovereignty 
of the WTO member states as it provides retaliation 
against violations of the trade agreements with 
unilateral sanctions especially for developing 
country members. The purpose of this article is to 
assess the validity of this claim in light of the actual 
functioning of the DSM, especially for developing 
countries, such as Indonesia.
B. Discussion
1. WTO Goals
WTO is best described as an umbrella 
organization under which the agreements that 
came out of the Uruguay Round are gathered.10 As 
the WTO Agreement states, the WTO is meant to 
provide the ‘common institutional framework’ for 
the implementation of the WTO agreements.11 The 
WTO thus serves four basic functions: 
a. To implement, administer, and carry 
out the WTO Agreement and its 
annexes;12
b. To act as a forum for ongoing 
multilateral trade negotiations;13
c. To serve as a tribunal for resolving 
disputes;14
d. To review the trade policies and 
practices of member states.15
Principally, one of WTO goals is to improve 
global welfare by helping the citizens of Member 
countries to gain the most benefit from participation 
in the global economy. The WTO is the successor 
of the old GATT 1947. GATT itself in 1970s has 
succeeded to bring the tariff of major industrialized 
countries down, so there was no tariff’s problem 
except the non-tariff barrier problems.16 The WTO 
was created as a unified administrative organ to 
oversee all of the Uruguay Round Agreements. 
The establishment of WTO, at least, has resolved 
two problems that hampered the old GATT. First, 
it has comprehensively handled trade problems 
that WTO agreement covers trade services and the 
protection of intellectual property rights. The WTO 
Agreement, which provides “separates institutional 
concepts from the substantive rules” eliminates 
the difficulty relates to trade of goods.17 Second, 
the WTO rectifies the structure problem of old 
GATT due to inexistence of the International Trade 
Organization (ITO).18
2. WTO DSM Jurisdiction
The dispute settlement procedure of the WTO 
is governed by the Understanding on Rules and 
9 Jan Bohanes and Fernanda Garza, “Going Beyond Stereotypes: Participation of Developing Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement”, Trade, 
Law, and Development Journal, Vol. IV, No. 1, Summer 2012. See also Mon-Mog Choi, “Korea’s Experience of Peaceful Settlement of WTO 
Disputes: Some Lessons for Asia”, Korean Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2013, p. 17.
10 For the further description of WTO see WTO, “What is the World Trade Organization?”,  www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.
htm#intro, accessed on 20th February 2015.
11 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, Article II, paragraph 1.
12 Ibid., Article III, paragraph 1.
13 Ibid., para. 2.
14 Ibid., para. 3.
15 Ibid., para. 4.
16 Anne O. Krueger, “Challenges Facing the Multilateral Trading System: An Overview”, in Lee-Jay Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim (Eds.), 2000, 
The Multilateral Trading System in a Globalizing World, Korean Development Institute, Bangok-dong, p. 6.
17 Uruguay Round Legislation, March 23, 1994, Hearing before the Senate Finance Committee, 103rd Congress, Second Session, p. 195 
(testimony of John H. Jackson), quoted from Ray August, et al., 2013, International Business Law: Text, Cases, and Readings, Pearson, 
United Kingdom, p. 367.
18 Id. The ITO Charter, the Havana Charter never entered into force. It never approved by the US Congress, and other states were not interested 
in establishing international organization for trade without the US as the world’s leading economy and trading nation. The ITO was ‘still-born’. 
Peter Van den Bossche, 2005, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases, and Materials, Univ. Cambridge Press, 
Cambridge, p. 81.
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Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(DSU).  The WTO DSM has jurisdiction over any 
disputes that may arise between WTO member 
states, above and beyond the provisions of any of 
the ‘Covered Agreements’ provided for in Appendix 
1 of the DSU, and it covers 83 (eighty three) distinct 
matters, including settled and inactive cases (see 
table 2: WTO Dispute cases by industry). That 
means, a dispute that violates WTO agreements 
rather than solved by the unilateral or regional forum 
it can only be dealt with the multilateral forum.
Table 2. WTO Dispute Cases by Industry19
No. Industry Number of Cases
1. Agricultural Products 32
2. Alcoholic and other beverages 6
3. Textile and Clothing 10
4. Animal Skin Products 2
5. Electronics 3
6. Telecommunications 3
7. Automobiles 5
8. Aircraft 2
9. Satellite System 1
10. Chemical Products 6
11. Pharmaceutical Products 5
12. Other Industrial Products 4
WTO members should respect the rules and 
WTO agreements in the interests of safer and more 
reliable multilateral trading system. In this sense, 
when WTO members consider that another WTO 
member’s trade policy measure or its’ action has 
violated the WTO’s agreement; they shall refer 
the matter to the WTO DSM rather than adopting 
unilateral measures, so that the trading system more 
secure and predictable. It was stated that:
[w]ithout a means of settling disputes, the 
rules-based system would be worthless 
because the rules could not be enforced. The 
WTO’s procedure underscores the rule of 
law, and it makes the trading system more 
secure and predictable. The system is based 
on clearly-defined rules, with timetables for 
completing a case.20
The WTO’s procedure for resolving trade quarrels 
under the DSU is vital for enforcing the rules and 
therefore for ensuring that trade flows smoothly. 
The DSU provides the primary legal means 
of settling trade related conflicts in the WTO. 
Settlement of disputes is the responsibility of the 
DSB that composed of all Members of the WTO. 
DSB has the sole authority to establish panels of 
experts to consider the case, and to accept or reject 
the panels’ findings or the results of an appeal. It 
monitors the implementation of the rulings and 
recommendations, and has the power to authorize 
retaliation when a WTO member does not comply 
with the ruling.21 
3. The WTO DSM is A New Paradigm on 
International Tribunal
The former WTO Director-General charac-
terized the WTO dispute settlement system as the 
most active international adjudicative mechanism in 
the world today.22 Although much of the procedure 
resembles a court or tribunal, the preferred solution is 
for the countries to settle the dispute by themselves. 
Unlike the dispute setlement mechanism under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
which preceded the WTO, the WTO DSM is much 
more comphrehensive and categorized as a new 
paradigm of international tribunal.23 The agreement 
emphasizes that prompt settlement is essential if 
the WTO is to function effectively. It sets out in 
considerable detail the procedures and the timetable 
to be followed in resolving disputes. The principal 
achievements of the WTO DSM as a new paradigm 
of international tribunal are summarised as follows.
19 The International Economics Study Center, “Chapter 2: The Dispute Resolution Mechanism”, http://internationalecon.com/wto/ch2.php, 
accessed on 20th February 2015.
20 WTO, “Trading into the Future”, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/ doload _e/tif.pdf, accessed on 20th February 2015.
21 Article 2 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
22 Supachai Panitchpakdi, et al., 2006, WTO at Ten: the Contribution of the Dispute Settlement System, p. 8, as cited in JHUMUNC, “Background 
Guide WTO”,  http://www.jhumunc.org /media/attachments/WTO_2014J.pdf,  accessed on 19th February 2015.
23 R. Read, “Trade Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding in the Wake of the GATT”, http://www.lums.
lancs.acuk/publications, accessed on 19th February 2015.
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a. The WTO DSM Has Fixed Time 
Limit
There are three main stages to the WTO 
dispute settlement process: (1) consultations 
between the parties; (2) adjudication by panels 
and, if applicable, by the Appellate Body; and 
(3) the implementation of the ruling, which 
includes the possibility of countermeasures 
in the event of failure by the losing party to 
implement the ruling. The DSU introduced 
a more structured process with more clearly 
defined stages in the procedure and time 
limits for every stages. Thus, every stages of 
the process has fixed time table. In total the 
time period of the WTO DSM is 1 year and 3 
month or 1 year without appeal.
Table 3. Time Table of WTO DSM24
These approximate periods for each stage of a 
dispute settlement procedure are target figures, the 
agreement is flexible. In addition, the countries 
can settle their dispute themselves at any stage. 
Totals are also approximate.
60 days Consultations, mediation, etc
45 days Panel set up and panellists appointed
6 months Final panel report to parties
3 weeks Final panel report to WTO members
60 days Dispute Settlement Body adopts report 
(if no appeal)
Total: 1 year (without appeal)
60-90 
days
Appeals repot
30 days Dispute Settlement Body adopts 
appeals report
Total: 1 year 3 months (with appeal)
In practice, the time period in the 
WTO DSM in total is 15 (fifteen) months 
(from consultations to the report of AB), and 
10 month for average duration of the ‘reason-
able period of time’ for implementation of 
DSB rulings. To achieve satisfaction it needs 
more less 2 (two) years not include the possi-
bility of compliance under art. 21.5 that add 2 
(two) years, this lengthy of time period due to 
the panel stage, namely, negotiation stage and 
translation problems.  However, if the case is 
considered urgent (e.g. if perishable goods 
are involved) then the allowed time is short-
er. In terms of developing country Members 
of WTO, the DSU takes into account their 
particular situation. Within the dispute settle-
ment system, the special and differentiated 
treatment they receive consists an additional 
or privileged procedures such as longer time 
periods. Therefore, the WTO DSM provide 
equality to all of the WTO member countries 
regardless of their country size and status.
b. The WTO DSM Utilized Informal 
Consultations 
Parties on dispute are expected to 
first seek to resolve dispute through bilateral 
discussion in capitals before invoking any 
of the WTO DSM. Most of the non-DSU 
WTO mechanisms for resolving disputes 
are easier and quicker to use than the DSU 
process. These mechanisms include informal 
consultations, raising the matter in the 
meetings of the relevant WTO committee, 
such as the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS), Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT) or Agriculture Committee and 
using some of the dispute settlement tools in 
specific agreements, such as the Subsidies 
Agreement. Article 7 of the DSU states that: 
A solution mutually acceptable to the parties 
to a dispute and consistent with the covered 
agreements in clearly to be preferred.25
If the consultation between parties 
fails, they can also ask the WTO Director-
General to mediate or try to help in any 
other way (good offices and conciliation) 
with the view to assisting members to settle 
a dispute especially in cases involving a less 
24 WTO, “Understanding The WTO: Settling Disputes”, https://www.wto.org /english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm, accessed on 19th 
February 2015.
25 Article 7 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
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developed country.26 Along with good offices, 
conciliation and mediation, consultations 
are the main non-judicial or diplomatic 
instrument in the WTO dispute settlement 
system.
c. The WTO DSM Has Established A 
New Appellate Procedure
The creation of the DSU was an 
integral element of the WTO Agreements. 
The DSU incorporates the rules and 
precedents established under the initially 
consensus-based GATT system into a formal 
rules-based judicial procedure. Although the 
DSU is founded upon GATT Articles XXII 
and XXIII, its scope and implementation 
represents a significant improvement over 
previous GATT disputes system. This 
includes the establishment of appellate body 
in the WTO DSM. This can be categorized 
as an inovation of international tribunal, that 
has not exist before. This will substitute for 
some of th ecouncil approval process of a 
panel report, and overcome blocking of a 
dispute-settlement panel report.27 Either side 
can appeal a panel’s ruling. Sometimes both 
sides do so. Appeals have to be based on 
points of law such as legal interpretation — 
they cannot reexamine existing evidence or 
examine new issues.
Each appeal is heard by three members 
of a permanent seven-member Appellate 
Body set up by the Dispute Settlement Body 
and broadly representing the range of WTO 
membership. Members of the Appellate 
Body have four-year terms. They have to 
be individuals with recognized standing in 
the field of law and international trade, not 
affiliated with any government.The appeal 
can uphold, modify or reverse the panel’s 
legal findings and conclusions. Normally 
appeals should not last more than 60 days, 
with an absolute maximum of 90 days. The 
DSU requires a negative consensus for the 
acceptance of an appellate ruling.  
d. The WTO DSM Has Established A 
Negative Consensus
The WTO DSM evolved out of the 
ineffective means used under the GATT for 
settling disputes among WTO members. 
Under the GATT, procedures for settling 
disputes were ineffective and time consuming 
since a single nation, including the nation 
whose action was the subject of complaint 
could effectively block or delay every stage 
of the dispute resolution process. This was 
happened since the GATT dispute mechanism 
was founded upon the principle of consensus 
between GATT contracting parties. 
In its early days, the system emphasized 
diplomatic negotiation and consensus. This 
required both parties to a trade dispute to 
accept the outcome of any finding. Panel 
reports were presented to the GATT Council 
for ratification. If a consensus accepted a 
Panel report, its findings became binding on 
the parties involved. Countries defending a 
complaint however could veto the ratification 
procedure and thereby avoid being obliged 
to bring their trade policy into GATT 
compliance. It was this right to circumvent 
the ratification of Panel findings that was 
deemed to be the most significant defect of 
the GATT dispute settlement system. 
The WTO DSU fixed the old system by 
using the negative consensus. Under the DSU 
the country losing a case cannot unilaterally 
block the adoption of the ruling. Under the 
previous GATT procedure, rulings could only 
be adopted by consensus, meaning that a 
single objection (including from the country 
which lost the case) could block the ruling. 
Under the DSU the situation is reversed; 
26 Article 5.6 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
27 John H. Jackson, 1997, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, The MIT Press, Cambridge, p. 125.
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rulings are automatically adopted, unless 
there is a consensus to reject a ruling. Any 
country that wants to block a ruling has to 
persuade all other WTO members (including 
its adversary in the case) to share its view.
The negative consensus requirement 
means that the adoption of Panel reports can 
no longer be blocked by losing respondents 
and thus triggers the right of plaintiffs to 
retaliate. A strict, and therefore predictable, 
timetable for the dispute settlement process is 
provided in article 20.  As a general rule, the 
DSB make decisions by consensus. However, 
when the DSB sets up panels, adopts reports or 
authorizes retaliation, the decision is adopted 
automatically, unless there is a consensus to 
the contrary (a negative consensus).28 Thus, 
the DSU incorporates the automaticity as a 
pivotal element of the dispute settlement 
process. The DSU is more effective dispute 
settlement mechanism for all WTO members 
than the GATT system, as this is primarily 
because the GATT system of consensus was 
vulnerable to political pressure while the 
WTO DSM utilizes a quasi-judicial system. 
4. Indonesia and The Global Economy
Indonesia is the largest economy in Southeast 
Asia and is the 16th largest economy in the world 
with GDP of $870 billion. Indonesia is a model of 
resilience as it has mounted an impressive recovery 
from the Asian financial crisis in 1998. Since the 
turn of the millennium, Indonesia has grown on 
average by 5,4% per year, easily surpassing the 
global average of 3,7%. Its rate of expansion has 
also been above the average of the other advanced 
ASEAN member countries. Growth is expected to 
rise further to 6% in the next few years. At this rate 
its economy will grow to $1 trillion by 2017 at the 
latest. 
Indonesia now is the 20th largest exporter of 
merchandise goods, which totaled of $183 billion 
in 2013.29 Indonesia’s commercial services export 
were about $21.7 billion in 2013. Other indicators of 
economic performance confirm Indonesia’s upward 
trajectory. FDI flows have grown nearly tenfold from 
only $1.9 billion in 2004 to $18.4 billion in 2013.30 
Indonesia was ranked by the World Economic 
Forum’s (WEF) global competitiveness ranking on 
34 out of 144 economies included in the rankings 
in terms of competitiveness. Indonesia’s ranking 
even higher than some EU and G-7 members. 
Indonesia’s strong economic performance is now 
leading global investors to include her in the “Next 
Eleven” list, a select group of emerging economies 
that together with the BRICS,31 have the potential 
of becoming the world’s largest economies in the 
coming decades. 
5.   Indonesia’s Role in The Multilateral 
Trading System
Indonesia has played very important role in 
the establishment of regional organization in the 
Southeast Asian region and in the world. Indonesia 
is one of founding member of ASEAN and hosted 
the headquarters of the organization. Indonesia 
is a member of some groups in the negotiations, 
namely, Asian developing members (33 member 
states), APEC, ASEAN, Cairns group, G-20, G-33, 
NAMA-11, and “W52” sponsors. 
Together with other ASEAN member states, 
is actively working to boost trade and investment 
ties with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region 
through initiatives like the ASEAN Plus Three, 
ASEAN-India, ASEAN-Japan, ASEAN-China, 
and ASEAN-CER, etc. Indonesia also one of the 
28 The negative consensus provisions are in article 6.1, 16.4 and 17.14 of the DSU, which is considered that the decision making of WTO DSB 
essentially automatic. See Andrew D. Mitchell, 2008, Legal Principles in WTO Disputes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 98.
29 WTO, “Indonesia Statistic Data”, http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView. aspx?Language=E&Country=ID, accessed on 
23th February 2015.
30 Ibid.
31 BRICS is the acronym for an association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, is a 
powerful bloc of emerging economies which, according to the International Monetary Fund, will account for as much as 61% of global growth 
in three years’ time, see South Africa Info, “New Era as South Africa Joins BRICS”,  http://www.southafrica.info/global/brics/brics-080411.
htm#.VOr4ey6qk3w,  accessed on 22th February 2015.
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founding members of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC),32 which is a leading proponent 
of ‘open regionalism’ as well as a member of the 
G-2033 that played such a vital role in coordinating 
the economic policy response to the global economic 
crisis. 
In the WTO, Indonesia is an important 
member of the G-33,34 which is one of the more 
influential developing country groupings in the 
WTO. As a member of G-33 and individually 
as well, Indonesia is a strong supporter of the 
multilateral trading system. Indonesia also a member 
of NAMA35 and “W52” sponsors, which is one of 
members of sponsors of TN/C/W/52, a proposal 
for “modalities’ in negotiations on geographical 
indications (the multilateral register for wines and 
spirits and extending the higher level of protection 
beyond wines and spirits) and “disclosure” (patent 
applicants to disclose the origin of genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge used in the inventions). 
The list includes as groups: the EU, ACP and 
African Group. Dominican Republic is in the ACP 
and South Africa is in the African Group, but they 
are sponsors of TN/IP/W/10/Rev.2 on geographical 
indications. Indonesia also joined the group of 
Cairns.36 Cairns is a coalition of agricultural 
exporting nations lobbying for agricultural trade 
liberalization. Indonesia is not only joined to some 
groups of negotiation in the WTO system, but also 
exercised the WTO DSM to solve a dispute with 
another WTO member country. Indonesia has 
involved in the WTO DSM as complainant for 9 
cases, as respondent for 11 cases, and as third party 
for 13 cases. 
6. The Developing Countries Members in 
WTO
The DSU contains several provisions 
directed to developing countries. The DSU states 
that members should give ‘special attention’ to 
the problems and interests of developing country 
members.37 Furthermore, if one party to a dispute is 
a developing country, that party is entitled to have 
at least one panelist who comes from developing 
country. If a complaint is brought against a 
developing country, the time for consultations 
before the panel is convened) may be extended, and 
if the dispute goes to a panel, the deadlines for the 
developing county to make its submissions may be 
extended. The Secretariat is authorized to provide 
a qualified legal expert to any developing country 
on request.  Still, settled disputes within the WTO 
DSM mainly on the basis of ‘the rule of law’.  
There are equal rights within the system 
among Member Countries, equal obligation to 
respect the results in keeping the fairness and 
objectivity of DSM.  There are some obstacles 
32 The APEC member states are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, China, Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea, Republic of, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, United 
States, Vietnam.
33 Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Plurinational State of Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay, Viet Nam; This group of G-20 is a coalition of developing 
countries pressing for ambitious reforms of agriculture in developed countries with some flexibility for developing countries (not to be con-
fused with the G-20 group of finance ministers and central bank governors, and its recent summit meetings), concern with agriculture issues, 
see WTO, “Agriculture: Negotiations”, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negoti_groups_e.htm, accessed on 22th February 2015. 
34 WTO members (23): Argentina, Bolivia, Plurinational State of, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, 
Zimbabwe. Also called “Friends of Special Products” in agriculture. Coalition of developing countries pressing for flexibility for developing 
countries to undertake limited market opening in agriculture, see WTO, “Agriculture: Negotiations”, Ibid.
35 WTO members (46): Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Plurinational State of, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, China, Congo, 
Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, 
Republic of, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, 
Bolivarian Republic of, Zambia, Zimbabwe ; Coalition of developing countries seeking flexibilities to limit market opening in industrial goods 
trade, main concerned  issues: NAMA, see WTO, “Agriculture: Negotiations”, Ibid.
36 WTO members that member of Cairns group are: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Plurinational State of, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay, Vietnam. The 
Cairns Group, see WTO, “Agriculture: Negotiations”, Ibid.
37 Gosego Rockfall Lekgowe, “The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Why it doesn’t Work for Developing Countries?”, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2045470, accessed on 23th February 2015.
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when the WTO member countries participating in 
the WTO DSM, especially developing countries.38 
Firstly, they lack of expertise or capacity to litigate 
in the WTO.  For instance, in negotiation phase, it 
can be said that negotiation is ‘direct and bilateral’ 
dispute settlement mechanism that based on 
‘bargaining power’ this phase often can be used as 
‘a fact finding procedure’ by opposing party, if one 
party in dispute has weak position. For example, 
Korea – measures concerning testing and inspection 
of agricultural products. It can be said that the 
WTO DSM should not be used as a last resort in 
settling trade disputes. But as alternative for both 
government of member countries on conflicted 
interests. 
Basically, the private sectors are the aggrieved 
exporter not the government. But, only government 
can activate the WTO DSM. The common problem 
is the identification and communication of trade 
barriers to the government. In this context, the main 
problem is how to ensure that the government is 
made aware of the measure (as trade barrier) and 
to assess that is in violation of WTO agreements. 
In other words, within the domestic regulatory 
framework need formal mechanisms, for example, 
the MOFAT (Korea), Section 301 of the Trade Act 
of 1974 in the US, and the European Union’s Trade 
Barriers Regulation.
The best mechanism regarding with the 
formal mechanisms within domestic regulatory 
framework is the Brazil’s mechanism: is an 
informal but effective one. This mechanism is based 
on interaction of three bodies, namely the Chamber 
of Foreign Trade (CAMEX), Private sector 
Consultative Council (Conex), and the General 
Dispute Settlement Unit /CGC in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affair. 
Another problem would be the enforcement 
of DSB recommendations upon the parties in 
dispute involving developing countries.39 There is 
fear of political or economic pressures on the part 
of respondent members. In this case the political 
or economic pressures will arise especially if 
the respondent countries have a higher level of 
development and as major trading partners or aid 
donors of the developing countries. To overcome this 
problem, WTO provides mechanism by instituting 
proceeding in the WTO DSM, challenging the large 
countries. Some instances of this case include, 
Korea versus the US on DRAMS (Dynamic Random 
Access Memory Semiconductors), Venezuela 
against the US over gasoline, Costa Rica versus the 
US on underwear, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras 
and Mexico against EU on bananas case, and 
Indonesia against UE on fatty alcohol. 
In the WTO context, there is another thing 
that should be considered by the member states 
concerning their commitments covering part of 
trade agreement not covered by the WTO DSM. 
In some occasions, countries are get benefit from 
preferential access to developed country markets 
under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). 
Some countries also get benefit from Preferential 
Trade Arrangement, for example AFTA, NAFTA, 
CAFTA, etc. When in these agreements dispute 
arise then the WTO DSM cannot cover this dispute. 
There is also a problem relate to inability 
of developing countries to enforce compliance 
with DSB recommendations. It should bear in 
mind, that the DSM mechanism should ensure 
that the losing respondent complies with the DSB 
recommendations contained in the panel report and 
brings its measures into conformity is through the 
suspension of equivalent measures (retaliation or 
reprisals). Problem of retaliation is when there is a 
substantial difference in size of economy. Based on 
data record of the WTO DSM, there are 19 arbitral 
decisions (Article 22.6 DSU) establishing the level 
of suspension and 17 (seventeen) authorizations by 
the DSB for measures of retaliation.
38 Gregory Shaffer, “How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country 
Strategies”, http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl /ebooks/files/ICTSD_Shaffer_How-to-Make.pdf, accessed on 23th February 2015, p. 26.
39 Yetty Komalasari Dewi, “The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Issues on Implementation”, Indonesian Journal of International Law, Vol. 5, 
No. 2, January 2008, p. 224.
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Regarding retaliation problem involving 
developing country as complainant, it can be said that 
the Brazil in cotton case against the US as the best 
example.40 In 2009, the arbitral awards was issued 
and authorized Brazil to take retaliatory measures 
calculated on the basis of yielding an annual amount 
varies as the amount of subsidies granted by the US. 
Also, the ‘cross-retaliation’ (suspend concessions 
under other agreements, including GATS and 
TRIPS) when the annual amount authorized for 
retaliatory measures exceeded a certain level.  In 
2010, Brazil announced its planned package of 
retaliatory measure, including increasing tariff on 
102 items imports from the US would enter into 
force within 30 days. It also suspended the protection 
of the US’ IPR. In April 2010, the parties adopted 
a MOU.41 The MOU consist of provision that in 
exchange for Brazil’s undertaking not to impose 
retaliatory measures the US agreed to change in the 
operation of its export credit guarantee program, 
namely, to establish an annual fund of $147 million 
to finance technical assistance and building capacity 
of Brazil cotton sector.42
C. Conclusion
The WTO DSM aims to provide predictability 
and security in international trade by providing strict 
time-frames, decision of the Appellate Body is final 
and binding. The WTO DSM also is designed to be 
mutually agreed by the disputing members, flexible 
and binding. It can be regarded as an efficient and 
effective resolution of trade disputes. The significant 
role of the WTO DSM is to balance the competing 
interest of the WTO member countries, by applying 
‘rules’ rather than ‘power’, and provide multilateral 
mechanism rather than unilateral. Member 
countries are not keeping their commitments when 
a member country applies a trade policy measure 
that is considered by other members to be violating 
the WTO agreements. In other words, the WTO 
DSM concerns with the application of a member’s 
domestic regulation against the interests of other 
members. 
The function of the DSM in WTO is to 
restore the balance (the conflicted interest of WTO 
members) by interpreting and applying the rules 
of the trading system to particular circumstances. 
The WTO integrated mechanism includes the DSU, 
the Covered agreements, the special or additional 
or procedures (for panels, the Appellate Body, 
and other WTO Agreements). For the developing 
countries in the WTO, they need major effort in 
terms of training and institutional reform to meet 
the challenges of participation in the WTO DSM. 
Also, it is necessary to develop internal mechanism, 
to enable private parties sectors of the developing 
member countries and always seek creative solution 
and arguments by using guidance and support from 
WTO rules. 
40 Randy Schnepf, “Status of the WTO Brazil – US Cotton Case”, http://nationalaglawcenter. org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/R43336.pdf, 
accessed on 22th February 2015.
41 Joint Brazil-U.S. communication, “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil Regarding a Fund for Technical Assistance and Capacity Building with Respect to the Cotton 
Dispute (WT/DS267) in the WTO, Randy Schnepf, Ibid.
42 MOU also provided that the United States working jointly with Brazil “on an understanding that is mutually satisfactory that will provide a 
framework for reaching a mutually agreed solution to the cotton dispute”. The joint work period started on April 22, 2010, and last for 60 days, 
during which Brazil would not impose countermeasures. See Raul A. Torres, “Use of WTO Trade Dispute Settlement Mechanism by the Latin 
American Countries-Dispelling Myths and Breaking Down Barriers”, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201203 _e.pdf, accessed 
on 22th February 2015.
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